VXLAN
— Virtual Extensible LANVXLAN encapsulates whole Ethernet frames inside UDP and IP so one Layer 2 segment can span a routed data center fabric. Each segment is identified by a 24-bit VXLAN Network Identifier, and tunnel endpoints add or remove the 8-byte VXLAN header, delivering far more isolated segments than the 4094 available to 802.1Q VLANs.
Interactive Session: How VXLAN Works
Step through the packet exchange sequence between nodes.
Interactive Execution Sandbox
Interact with a live or clearly-labelled simulated instance of VXLAN.
Threat Model & Attack Simulation
How this protocol is attacked in practice, what defenders can see, and which control stops it.
Threat model & attack simulation
SimulatedDefensive education. Every step runs in this page; no traffic is generated or sent.
VXLAN VNI hopping
InjectionA host that can send VXLAN frames injects traffic into another VNI on the same underlay.
Reach the underlay
The attacker gains access to a host or switch that can send VXLAN traffic.
VTEP traffic from an unapproved source.
Cross-segment injection and isolation bypass.
Defences that matter
- VNI ACLs on VTEPs
- Isolate the underlay from tenants
- BUM traffic rate limits and monitoring
This is a conceptual model for defenders, not an exploit toolkit. It contains no payloads, tooling or instructions for attacking systems you do not own.
Protocol Specification & Architecture
Key characteristics, real-world deployment patterns, and trade-offs.
Core Technical Features
- 8-byte VXLAN header carrying a 24-bit VNI, giving 16,777,216 possible segments
- MAC-in-UDP encapsulation with destination port 4789
- VTEPs implemented in hypervisors or on top-of-rack switches
- BUM traffic replicated by underlay multicast or by head-end replication
- Outer IP header lets the underlay route and ECMP-hash encapsulated traffic
Real-World Use Cases
- Layer 2 extension across a Layer 3 spine-and-leaf data center fabric
- Multi-tenant isolation in private and public clouds
- Live VM migration between racks without readdressing guests
Advantages & Strengths
- Segment scale far beyond the 4094 limit of VLAN IDs
- No spanning tree in the underlay, so every uplink can be used
- Tenant segment identity is decoupled from physical switch configuration
Limitations & Vulnerabilities
- Adds 50 bytes of overhead over IPv4, so the underlay MTU must grow or the inner MTU must shrink
- Troubleshooting is harder because the underlay cannot see the encapsulated frame