DMARC
— Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and ConformanceDMARC builds on SPF and DKIM by requiring that at least one of them pass for a domain aligned with the From header. Domain owners publish a policy in DNS and receive aggregate and forensic reports, giving senders visibility and receivers a clear instruction for unauthenticated mail.
Interactive Session: How DMARC Works
Step through the packet exchange sequence between nodes.
Interactive Execution Sandbox
Interact with a live or clearly-labelled simulated instance of DMARC.
Threat Model & Attack Simulation
How this protocol is attacked in practice, what defenders can see, and which control stops it.
Threat model & attack simulation
SimulatedDefensive education. Every step runs in this page; no traffic is generated or sent.
Subdomain policy gap
SpoofingA p=none policy or a missing sp= record leaves subdomains available for spoofing.
Read the policy
The attacker checks the organisational domain DMARC record.
p=none or no DMARC at all.
Phishing from lookalike subdomains.
Defences that matter
- p=reject with sp=reject
- Inventory and monitor all subdomains
- Act on aggregate reports
This is a conceptual model for defenders, not an exploit toolkit. It contains no payloads, tooling or instructions for attacking systems you do not own.
Protocol Specification & Architecture
Key characteristics, real-world deployment patterns, and trade-offs.
Core Technical Features
- Identifier alignment checks SPF or DKIM against the From header domain
- Policy modes p=none, p=quarantine, and p=reject published in DNS
- Aggregate reports (rua) and forensic reports (ruf) sent back to the owner
- Subdomain policy (sp=) and percentage sampling (pct=) controls
Real-World Use Cases
- Blocking phishing that forges a company From domain
- Monitoring SPF and DKIM coverage before enforcing rejection
- Protecting a brand across all of its subdomains
Advantages & Strengths
- Gives domain owners a single enforceable policy for spoofed mail
- Reporting reveals which legitimate senders are misconfigured
Limitations & Vulnerabilities
- Depends entirely on correct SPF and DKIM deployment
- Strict rejection can break forwarded mail if alignment fails